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Abstract : This paper specifically looks at the implications of Thomas S. Kuhn's 
ideas regarding the distinction between context of justification and 
context of discovery in the emergence of science. Kuhn's thesis is that 
science is not only formed from the context of justification, but the 
context of discovery (history) must also be considered. The method of 
research is an in-depth interpretation towards the relevance text to the 
research and then the author applies analytical method to examine 
certain terms objectively. The author also applies historical method to 
see the historical aspects of a thought and finally applies the heuristic 
method to obtain the novelty of a work. The results of the study indicate 
that by considering the context of invention of science, Kuhn is in fact 
trapped in an epistemological relativism. Kuhn's main weakness is the 
absolute and extreme discontinuity among competing paradigms due to 
his main idea of the incommensurability paradigm, that is, it is 
impossible to compare one paradigm to another. In this short article the 
author mutually analyses Kuhn's ideas with critical method. Finally, the 
author notes that special nature of such paradigms socially and culturally 
does not create a relative gap necessarily. However, it should be a capital 
of conversation and dialogue across cultures and civilizations. 
Keywords : Incommensurability, Relativistic, Paradigm, Thomas S. Khun 
Abstrak : Paper ini secara spesifik melihat implikasi gagasan Thomas S. Kuhn 
mengenai pembedaan antara context of justification dengan context of 




hanya terbentuk dari konteks pembenaran, tetapi konteks penemuan 
(sejarah) juga harus diperhatikan. Metode yang digunakan dalam paper 
ini adalah interpretasi mendalam atas teks yang telah diseleksi untuk 
relevansi tulisan ini, setelah itu penulis melakukan metode analisis untuk 
menelaah istilah-istilah tertentu secara objektif, serta digunakan metode 
historis guna melihat aspek kesejarahan dalam sebuah pemikiran. 
Metode terakhir dari tulisan ini adalah metode heuristika, atau 
kebaharuan dalam suatu karya. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa 
dengan alasan mempertimbangkan konteks penemuan pada sains inilah, 
Kuhn pada kenyataannya terjebak pada relativis epistemologis. 
Kelemahan utama Kuhn adalah diskontinuitas mutlak dan ekstrim 
antara paradigma-paradigma yang bersaing akibat gagasan utamanya 
tentang incommensurability paradigma, yakni adalah hal yang tidak 
mungkin membandingkan antara satu paradigma dengan paradigma 
lain. Dalam tulisan singkat ini penulis berupaya mendialogkan secara 
timbal-balik gagasan-gagasan Kuhn dengan telaah kritis yang penulis 
lakukan. Sebagai catatan akhir, bahwa kekhasan setiap paradigma yang 
secara sosial dan budaya semestinya tidak serta merta membuat jurang 
yang jatuh ke arah relatif. Namun, Justru dan kekhasan paradigma 
menjadi modal percakapan, dialog lintas budaya dan peradaban. 




The science philosophers agree that positivism should be 
attenuated and be even cut off by criticizing immanent on the 
science. Immanent term actually emerges from a problem on the relationship 
between God, nature and humans. The idea that God creates and dominates 
the world through the 'presence' of God in the world and in history of the 
world and human is called as immanency. However, for this study the author 
follows Mc. Charthy who uses the immanent term in the meaning of a 
historical and empirical criticism of science, not a transcendental and 
metaphysical criticism. 
Empirical criticism is done by dismantling the veil of science 
objectivity and scientific rationality which has long been inherent in the 
nature of science. Unlike the previous science philosophers, 
Kuhn's criticism is more directed at the process of forming (tadwin) science, 
which is based on history and sociology. Naturally, the stand point of 
Kuhn's epistemological building is based on the history of science. 
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There are several former works that specially discussed implication 
of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm, such as its implication toward education, law, 
and religious thoughts. However, the author limits the study only on Kuhn’s 
thought about paradigm and scientific revolution. Of them are first 
Nurkholis’s work entitled Konstruksi Teori Paradigma Thomas S. Kuhn 
(Construction of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Paradigm Theory) (2012)1. This work 
discusses the paradigm as a set of general theoretical assumption, laws, and 
application technique embraced by member of scientific community. It is 
possible to occur sift of paradigm. Therefore, scientists who work within 
objective deals have to realise paradigm incommensurability that they follow 
it all the time.  
The second one is Ulfa Kesuma and Ahmad Wahyudi Hidayat 
works entitled Pemikiran Thomas S. Kuhn Teori Revolusi Paradigma 
(Thomas S. Kuhn Thought on Paradigm Revolution Theory) (2020) 2. This 
paper explains the paradigm as a perspective, principle, method, and value 
in solving the problems strongly embraced by a scientific community. The 
paradigm supervises a scientific activity in period of normal sciences when 
scientists have occasion to develop it in detail and depth. They also do not 
criticise the paradigm supervising their activities. It goes until anomaly phase 
when they see several phenomena that are unexplainable on their theories, 
so a knowledge crisis occurs. This work also tries to actualise Kuhn’s thought 
in Islamic knowledge, particularly in opening Muslim scientist mindset that 
essentially there is no absolute truth in sciences. However, it always opens a 
possibility to emerge new knowledge with new scientific epistemology that 
people sometimes hold it stronger.  
The third work is Sonjoruri B. Trisakti’s entitled Thomas S. Kuhn 
dan Tradisi-Inovasi dalam Langkah Metodologi Riset Ilmiah (Thomas S. 
Kuhn and Innovation Tradition in Step of Scientific Research 
Methodology) (2008)3. This work is sufficiently in depth to review Kuhn's 
thoughts from the aspects of the methodological steps of scientific research 
in the period of normal science and in the scientific revolutions period. The 
methodological steps of scientific research in the normal period of science 
 
1 Nurkholis, “Konstruksi Teori Paradigma Thomas S. Kuhn,” Islam Future XI, no. 
2 (2012). 
2 Ulfa Kesuma, “Pemikiran Thomas S. Kuhn Teori Revolusi Paradigma,” 
Islamadina 21, no. 2 (2020). 
3 Sonjoruri B. Trisakti, “Thomas S. Kuhn Dan Tradisi-Inovasi Dalam Langkah 




aim at strengthening and developing a single applicable paradigm so that the 
resulted theoretical development is cumulative with a stronger attachment 
to tradition than the power of produced innovation. Meanwhile, the 
methodological steps of research in the scientific revolutions period aim at 
solving crises which the old paradigm cannot solve by solving it through the 
new paradigm, so that the resulting theoretical development is non-
cumulative with the power of innovation that is more prominent than the 
attachment to tradition. In the normal science period, knowledge is 
developed in a strict paradigm box, so that observations and experiments 
carried out in creating new theories are limited by existing paradigms and 
the resulted theory is obtained on the basis of pre-existing theories. It makes 
theory develops cumulatively. In the scientific revolutions, knowledge is 
developed through experimental ideas that are outside the paradigm held by 
the majority of scientists. Observations and experiments aim at testing any 
new ideas that attempt to solve the old paradigm crises. This makes the 
power of innovation very important and makes the attachment to tradition 
very weak. 
Based on several former works, there are fundamental differences 
with this paper. The works of Nurkholis, Ulfa Kesuma and Ahmad Wahyudi 
Hidayat discuss more about the meaning of paradigms and scientific 
revolutions, especially in Ulfa Kesuma work there is additional implications 
of Kuhn's paradigm for Islamic scholarship. In contrast to the two (2) works 
mentioned above, Sonjoruri's work focuses more on innovation-traditions 
in the normal science period and the scientific revolutions period. 
Meanwhile, in this paper the author points out basic weaknesses of Kuhn’s 
paradigms. First, the arguments for the history of science are always limited 
by space and time. Kuhn's idea is shifted to relativity, such as the idea of a 
standard or criterion for judging a paradigm. Second, another fundamental 
weakness of Kuhn’s paradigms is related to an incommensurability of the 
inter-paradigm dialogue. Thus, the scientific world is patterned and 
structured in polarization among paradigms without any mediation among 
them. 
The research is a library research, therefore the first step the 
researcher takes is collecting data on object of the research in 
particular. Data are collected by coding each subsystem of research 
data. The research is designed qualitatively in which while collecting the 
data, the researcher at once is analysing the data to understand the meaning 
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and capture the essence of collected data category4. The data are step by step 
collected by: 1) recording data in quotation, namely recording data from the 
data source directly and accurately; recording the data on the data card 
in paraphrase, 2) recording and capturing the whole essence of the data then 
recording it on the data card, using sentences compiled by the researcher 
3) recording data synoptically, namely recording data from data sources by 
making a summary5. 
The used library sources are Kuhn's works entitled: The Structure 
of Scientific Revolution, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
19706; "The Relationship between History and History of Science" 
in Interpretative Social Science A Reader, Paul Rabinow and William M. 
Sullivar (ed.). London: University of California Press, 19797; Struan Jacobs 
and Brian Mooney, Sociology as a Source of Anomaly in Thomas Kuhn's 
System Science, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 27 No. 4, December 
19978. 
The collected data are analysed by using the following methods: 1) 
Interpretation method in which the first step is carried out by describing and 
revealing the essential meaning contained in the research object. Verbal data 
are analysed by revealing semantic meaning, then revealing the meaning of 
depth, essential or deep structure9 The essential meaning in logical criticism 
is, of course, not only at the empirical level, but also understanding the 
context behind the emergence of ideas, motives and even ideologies that are 
promoted in these ideas. 2) Analysis method which is used to objectively 
and critically analyse the concepts of revolution, incommensurability and 
others based on the meaning of the word10. The analysis is only and purely 
 
4 Kaelan, Metode Penelitian Kualitatif Bidang Filsafat (Yogyakarta: Paradigma, 
2005), 159. 
5 Kaelan, Metode Penelitian Kualitatif Bidang Filsafat (Yogyakarta: Paradigma, 
2005), 160-161. 
6 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, 2013, https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226458106.001.0001. 
7 Thomas S Kuhn, “The Relation Between History and History of Science,” in 
Interpretatif Social Science A Reader, ed. William Rabinow, Paul, M. Sullivar (London: 
University of California Press, 1979). 
8 Struan Jacobs and Brian Mooney, “Sociology as a Source of Anomaly in Thomas 
Kuhn’s System of Science,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27, no. 4 (1997): 466–85. 
9 Poespoprodjo, Interpretasi (Bandung: Remaja Karya, 1987), 1. 
10 J Sudarminta, “Diktat Epistemologi, Pengantar Ke Beberapa Masalah Pokok 




based on reasoning. Analytical truth is considered, created, and sustained by 
abriter human decisions by using a concept that is merely implication of 
linguistic conventions. 3) Historical method that strives to link a thought 
with cultural, ideological, political and social historicity. The method also 
attempts to determine the historical periodization11. The method is used to 
see the historicity of Kuhn's thought, especially in relation to the historical 
context in science. 4) Heuristic method i.e. the theory of finding a way to 
overcome a problem scientifically. Heuristics always precedes science. The 
science has to describe, explain, prove the path towards science (heuristics) 
although it does not include explicitly. Hence, heuristics is usually 
considered as a field that cannot be sharply matched. The field includes a 
large number of non-scientific factors, however it is important for the 
emergence of knowledge or science12. Factors that have been considered as 
non-scientific are metaphysical assumptions, context of 
discovery, prejudice, and others. The author hopes that the discovery or 
novelty of the research will produce new offerings, especially in the fields of 
epistemology and methodology. 
In general, methodical steps are first directed at interpreting the 
selected data according to the title of the paper. The first methodical step is 
expected to be able to deeply understand the ideas of the scientific 
revolution, as well as the theoretical basis or formal object used as a 
framework for analysis. The next step, the author uses is analysis method as 
a pre-condition in applying the historical method (historical thought). 
 
B. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework in this research uses Jurgen Habermas’s 
communication theory. According to Habermas, the concept of 
communicative rationality contains three dimensions13; namely: first, the 
relation between subject of knowledge and events and facts in the world; 
second, the relation between the subject and social actions in the world; the 
subject practically interacts with others; and finally the relation between 
 
11 Charris Bakker, Anton, Zubair, Metodologi Penelitian Filsafat (Yogyakarta: 
Kanisius, 1990), 47. 
12 Van Peursen, Fakta, Nilai, Peristiwa: Tentang Hubungan Ilmu Dan Etika, ed. A. 
Sonny Keraf, Terjemahan (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1990), 97. 
13 Rick Roderick, Jurgen Habermas and Fundations of Critical Theory (New York: 
St Martin’s Press, 1986), 113. 
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subject’s sufferings and desires (in Feurbach's terms) and its internal nature, 
its subjectivity and other subjectivities. 
Formally, the concept of communicative rationality is explained in 
different ways, namely through the suitability of arguments. It is useful for 
evaluating established validity claims relating to the three dimensions of 
communicative action: external, community, and the internal realm.14 
In the directed communication at external realm (cognitive-
instrumental realm), rationality contains expressions that underlie correct 
views and actions as well as an ability to learn from mistakes.15 The right 
argumentation pattern in this dimension is a theoretical discourse in which 
truth claims; the efficiency of teleological action is the subject of discussion. 
Meanwhile, in communication that leads to society (practical-moral area), 
rationality contains justification for actions that refer to established norms, 
carefully, especially in conflict situations, as well as in assessing debates from 
a 'moral view' oriented towards consensus.16 The appropriate pattern of 
argumentation for this dimension is practical discourse, claims of normative 
accuracy being a topic of discussion.17 
In the directed communication at the internal realm (the area of 
judgment and statement), rationality contains the desired and needed 
nature interpretation (like any other). It is the standard stipulated culturally, 
and even more, in adopting a reflective attitude towards their value 
standards.18 Here a universal agreement cannot be expected, so the type of 
argumentation is not with discourse but with aesthetic criticism. The 
adequacy of value standard is a topic of conversation in this context.19 To 
Habermas, the arguments reproduced in the psychoanalytic dialogue also 
reside in this dimension (the internal realm). In this context, rationality 
contains the willingness and ability to free itself from illusions (not a false 
fact), which comes from self-deception.20 This type of argument through 
 
14 Ibid, 114. 
15 Ibid, 114. 
16 Jurgen Habermas, Theory of Communication Action (1): Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 19. 
17 Ibid, 19. 
18 Roderick, Jurgen Habermas and Fundations of Critical Theory, 114-115. 
19 Habermas, Theory of Communication Action (1): Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, 20. 




therapeutic critique helps clarify systematic self-deception.21 Finally, in the 
communication directed at the language itself, rationality here seeks to 
overcome communication disorders through reading in order to bring 
understanding and reflect linguistic rules. Both, the comprehensiveness of 
symbolic expressions and the meaning of these expressions can be tested 
reflectively.22 The right type of argumentation in this dimension is to explain 
clearly (explicative discourse), where it can be understood and formed from 
symbolic expressions that are no longer considered naive, but are clearly the 
subject of discussion.23 
Apart from Habermas's communication theory, another used 
theory is the legitimacy of Lyotard's scientific knowledge. In analysing the 
legitimacy of science in post-industrial society, Lyotard uses a language 
game 'borrowed from' Wittgeistein. According to Lyotard's interpretation 
toward Wittgenstein's language game concept, language is not a single 
phenomenon, homology, i.e. totalizing the system in a single language, but a 
historical phenomenon which has locally and specifically basic character. 
We cannot judge one language game by measuring another language game.24 
Lyotard emphasizes the importance of rhetorical and competitive aspects in 
every language game. The interaction among language games is marked by 
a tendency to conquer one another. Each resulted language expressions can 
be seen as a kind of "political act" to dominate other language acts. In the 
language system, the marker presupposes verbal speech, namely speaking. 
Talking means "fighting" or "struggling" in a language game traffic struggle. 
Therefore, something considered to be radically democratic is a strategy of 
activating paralogy, namely the recognition of various languages. The main 
point is that a movement is needed to undermine the established and 
dominant language game by activating differences, as well as making 
continuous innovation and experimentation.25 
 
21 Habermas, Theory of Communication Action (1): Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, 21. 
22 Roderick, Jurgen Habermas and Fundations of Critical Theory, 115. 
23 Habermas, Theory of Communication Action (1): Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, 22. 
24 Rizal Mustansir, Filsafat Analitik, Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Peranan Para 
Tokohnya (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2001), 112. 
25 I Sugiharto, Postmodernisme, Tantangan Bagi Filsafat (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 
1996), 58. 
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There are three characteristics for every language game. First, each 
rule in the game does not get legitimacy from itself but it is the result of a 
contract among the players (explicitly or not). Second, if there is no rule, 
there is no game; a small modification of a rule will change the game. Third, 
each statement must be considered as a "move" in the game. The third 
characteristic is used by Lyotard as the first principle that underlies the 
whole method: issuing a statement (move) is fighting - in the context of a 
game - and the act of issuing such a statement is in the domain of "general 
agonistics" (a fight statement / argumentation). The principle of "statement 
struggle" leads Lyotard to the second principle, namely that social ties in 
society consist of "move-move" of language.26 
 
C. Criticism on the Incommensurability and Incommensurability of 
Paradigms 
According to Kuhn, change and development of science are not 
based on empirical proving to know that a theory is wrong. However, the 
development of science occurs precisely through the scientific 
revolution and based on the history of science. Kuhn considers that the 
progress nature of science in revolutionary period is non-
cumulative, while in normal science period, the science is evolutionary or 
cumulative. However, Kuhn emphasizes more on which the nature of 
science is revolutionary and accumulative. 
Essentially, Kuhn opposes the thesis of science unity that has been 
adopted by positivism and been leaved by Popper. According to 
him, science is not one but plural; scientists actually work under one 
paradigm which contains ontological and methodological assumptions, and 
value structure. So, what is a paradigm? The special term, Thomas S. Kuhn 
uses has so many meanings. There are at least 22 definitions. However, the 
definition of a paradigm can be summarized into three meanings: first, the 
conceptual framework for classifying and explaining physical objects of 
universe. Second, it is a benchmark for specifying the appropriate methods, 
 
26 H. Dwi Kristanto, “Ketidakpercayaan Terhadap Metanarasi Kondisi 




techniques and instruments used in researching the relevant object. Third, 
it sis an agreement about legitimate cognitive goals27 
One simple example to illustrate the definition is that positivism is 
a paradigm. Positivism embraces the ontological assumption of a 
Newtonian mechanical universe; methodological assumptions of distance 
observation; and the value structure of glorifying objectivism. Positivism 
paradigm does not derive its legitimacy inter-subjectively but 
objectively. Positivism is valid because there is an academic community 
that upholds it and continues to reproduce it. Paradigm becomes a 
conceptual framework in perceiving the universe. It means that there are no 
neutral observations. All perceptual experiences of individuals has always 
been shaped by the used conceptual framework. For example, Aristotle saw 
the motion of a falling object as a straight line, while Newton perceived it as 
a pendulum motion. According to Kuhn, it was due to the different 
paradigms the both adopted. Aristotle and Newton adopted different 
ontological assumptions about the universe. 
In Popper period, the debate in the science philosophy discourse is 
on the science progress. Popper believes that science moves in an 
evolutionary direction toward the truth. Popper believes that there is a 
cognitive accumulation that allows for rational comparisons between one 
theory and another. It means that there is a continuity between one theory 
and another. Kuhn rejects Popper's ideas and proposes the principle of 
incommensurability. The principle also opposites the continuity among 
theories. It is impossible, because they work under their respective 
paradigms. The scientists are guided by their paradigm in formulating the 
problem, research patterns, and so on. 
In order to understand well concepts of discontinuity and 
incommensurability, it is necessary to firstly understand Kuhn's thought 
about the progress of science. To Kuhn, the progress of science begins 
from competitive struggle for the theory to gain inter-subjective legitimacy 
of the science community. The theory that gains social legitimacy will 
emerge as a paradigm. This is the normal science period where there are 
only justifications according to the paradigm assumptions adopted by the 
community. So, how can pluralism of reasoning and conceptual framework 
 
27 John Tresch, “On Going Native: Thomas Kuhn and Anthropological Method,” 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2001, https://doi.org/10.1177/004839310103100302, 
303-305. See also D G Adian, Menyoal Objektivisme Ilmu Pengetahuan: Dari David Hume 
Sampai Thomas Kuhn (Penerbit Teraju, 2002) , 86. 
Disruption and Incommensurability Among Thomas S. Kuhn’s Paradigms 
KALAM, Volume 15, No. 1 (2021) 113 
 
reach consensus in a scientific community? Kuhn says that it occurs due 
to family likeness, a concept Wittgenstein puts forward to explain his 
thought in the language philosophy. Each member of the family is not one 
hundred percent similar to each other, although there are similarities that 
make them can be called as one family. 
Kuhn states in his book entitled The Structure of Scientific 
Revolution that the seeds of science first appear as individual activities and 
then they proceed to normal science. However, anomalies which indirectly 
destroy normal science then appear. Such anomalies cause a crisis which 
then forces the scientists to radically question ontological and 
methodological basics, and used values. In the end, this critical reflection 
produces a new paradigm in order to overcome the anomaly where the new 
paradigm emerges is completely different from the old one. These 
methodical steps of Kuhn's thought are known as the scientific Revolution28. 











The steps of Kuhn’s science revolution can be explained as 
follows: a wide variety fragmented and disorganized activities that initiate 
forming the science is eventually structured and directed up to one time 
when single paradigm is embraced by the science community 29. At the first 
stage, the collected facts are not complete, therefore the explanation has to 
be taken from the outside, metaphysics, other sciences or from personal and 
historical events. It is not surprising that at the early development of any 
 
28 Kuhn, Struct. Sci. Revolutions, 141-154. 
29 A F Chalmers, Apa Itu Yang Dinamakan Ilmu?: Suatu Penilaian Tentang Watak 












sciences, different people can explain or interpret any same symptoms in a 
different way. In the end, these differences slowly compete and disappear in 
long period and then it occurs as a paradigm30. A single paradigm emerges as 
an authoritative reference in every step of the scientific practitioners. The 
survive groups that do not adapt will gradually be evicted and thrown off the 
circle of paradigm. 
If the paradigm has already gained a legitimacy from 
the scientific community, all scientific activities such as research will be 
around the paradigm. Scientific activities in this period referred to as 
the normal science. According to Kuhn, research in the normal science era 
is aimed at articulating the symptoms and theories, the paradigm has 
presented31. Normal science can be stated as a puzzle solving and everything 
is directed by paradigm32. 
Normal science is a research that is firmly based on one or more past 
scientific achievements. Scientific achievements that certain scientific 
societies at one time can be claimed as providing the foundation for further 
practice. Today the achievements are recounted, although it is difficult to 
find them originally in elementary and advanced science textbooks. The 
textbooks describe in detail the accepted theory; they explain many or all the 
successful applications; and they compare those applications with 
experiments and observations.33 
Furthermore, if a scientist accepts a particular paradigm, his 
research will be aimed at answering problems arising from the paradigm. At 
one time, the paradigm stops proposing questions; many oddities or many 
phenomena, the theory cannot explain, appear. Thus, it is called as 
anomaly34. If the anomalies accumulate and reach the higher quality, a crisis 
will emerge. 
In times of crisis, the paradigm is paralyzed and unable to answer 
problems completely. In such conditions the paradigm is revisited, and in 
turn a new paradigm will emerge. If new paradigms emerge, it will produce 
 
30 Ferry Susanto, “Thomas S. Kuhn: Relativis Epistemologis?,” XXV (Jakarta, 
n.d.), 41. 
31 Kuhn, Struct. Sci. Revolutions, 23. 
32 Kuhn, “The Relation Between History and History of Science., 472” 
33 Zainal Abidin Bagir, “Hand out Kuliah Filsafat Kealaman,” 2008. 
34 R Verhaak, C., Haryono Imam, Filsafat Ilmu Pengetahuan (Jakarta: Gramedia 
Pustaka, 1989), 165. 
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theories that were never thought before. The shift between the old paradigm 
and the new one is called by Thomas S. Kuhn a "scientific revolution". The 
crisis arises when normal science undergoes anomalies. It means that the 
single paradigm that has been glorified so far is unable to solve the arising 
problems. Scientists question the ontological, epistemological and 
axiological basics of the paradigm. 
A new paradigm is born when science is in crisis. The crisis, 
to Kuhn, is a necessary and important precondition for the emergence of 
new theories. All crises in science end in one of three ways: (1) that normal 
science is sometimes able to deal with problems that generate crises even 
though the paradigm has ended. (2) On other occasions, problems will 
survive without solution, even using radically new approaches. Up to that 
point, scientists hide away the problem for future generations who were 
more sophisticated. (3) A crisis then ends when a new paradigm candidate 
and a struggle in which new paradigm can be accepted by the scientific 
community appear35. 
The author in this context states that there are at least two main 
critics: namely regarding Kuhn's main idea of incommensurability among 
competing scientific concepts or languages; then Kuhn's idea of absolute 
and extreme discontinuity among competing paradigms. Kuhn’s conceptual 
relativism lies in the keyword that every scientific paradigm is 
incommensurable.36 Thus, Kuhn has to suppose that the entire language of 
observation applied by a paradigm characterizes the data carefully and does 
not allow the meaning of the paradigms to be separated. Competing 
paradigms are shackled by language and its own observations. Everything 
the paradigm does requires specific and untranslatable theoretical 
concepts. As a result, competing paradigms cannot explain the same 
observational data or answer the same questions about them, because there 
is no common language between the two competing paradigms and there is 
no communication between the two paradigms. At this level, Kuhn fails 
because assuming transition or leaping a belief from one paradigm to a new 
one is regarded as a more plausible. The authors precisely consider it as 
something non-scientific or irrational. Another thorny problem facing Kuhn 
is whether the new paradigm that is emerging provides a better explanation? 
 
35 Susanto, “Thomas S. Kuhn: Relativis Epistemologis?”, 43 
36 Sudarminta, “Diktat Epistemologi, Pengantar Ke Beberapa Masalah Pokok 




According to Kuhn, competing incommensurable paradigms are 
caused by the fact that they do not speak in the same language, but 
they only have the same study material so that they can still 
be meaningfully compared. At this point, Kuhn mentions a number 
of criteria that can be used to judge whether a theory is better than its 
competitors. These criteria include: “accuracy of forecasts, especially 
quantitative forecasts; a balance between the core of daily problems and the 
problem of expertise, as well as the number of problems that have been 
solved”37. Such criteria create the values in the scientific community. So, the 
methods used by the values "must at the end of the analysis be psychological 
and sociological"38. 
Kuhn states that the most valid and high standard is the agreement 
of the scientific community39. It means that whether a theory is better than 
another, must be judged relatively according to the standards accepted by 
the local community. In author’s opinion, these standards are 
typically different according to the cultural and historical conditions of 
each society. Kuhn’s relativism appears in his Postcript in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolution. According to him, "Scientific knowledge, like 
language, is intrinsically the common property of a community, otherwise it 
means nothing. To understand it, we need to recognize the specific 
characteristics of the community that created and used it.40 Thus, Kuhn is 
actually a value relativist. However, the accusation as a relativist 
is totally rejected by Kuhn himself. He argues that: 'the letter scientific 
theory is better than the previous theory at solving problems that exist in 
different environments in which they were applied. According to him, this is 
not a relativist position, it shows his belief in scientific progress41. Based on 
the statement, it seems that Kuhn wants to specify a universal criterion for 
judging the usefulness of a theory, namely the ability to solve problems. 
The author considers that the position is very difficultly 
maintained, because Kuhn asserts that judgment based on problem-solving 
abilities "does not compel individually or collectively" as far as related to the 
relative utility of competing paradigms. Isn't Kuhn led on a relative position 
 
37 Kuhn, Struct. Sci. Revolutions, 154. 
38 T. A. A. Broadbent, I. Lakatos, and A. Musgrave, “Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge,” The Mathematical Gazette, 1972, https://doi.org/10.2307/3613721, 21. 
39 Kuhn, Struct. Sci. Revolutions, 97. 
40 Kuhn, 210. 
41 Kuhn, 206. 
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again? According to Kuhn, aesthetic considerations (which assumes that the 
new theory is 'neater', 'more suitable', and 'more simple' than the old 
one) can sometimes be prescriptive42 
Kuhn still refuses a claim that he is a relativist who was 
anti- scientific advancement. According to him, if succession of the 
paradigm is not understood as a progress, differentiation of the pre-
paradigm and the paradigm loses its significance. The movement from fierce 
competition which contains hundreds of reasoning and conceptual 
frameworks creates a paradigm which is legally accepted and becomes 
pervasive by showing the progress of science. 
There are value sanctions in a scientific community to 
guide the choices made by individual scientists, including accuracy, scope, 
utility and so on. The scientists who hold on the values that can make 
different choices in the same concrete situation, because scientists in the 
same situation may differ in assigning different weights to values, and may 
apply the same criteria differently in the same context.  Kuhn states: "It is 
difficult to find any other criterion that so clearly defines a field as science"43 
It is impossible to compare one paradigm with another in related to 
the problem of paradigm incommensurability. Paradigm is an artificial 
universe; hence it's useless to compare the two paradigms, because we are 
talking about two different universes. Therefore, there is Kuhn’s relativistic 
dictum to know: "the two scientists who work on two different paradigms 
are in two different worlds". Kuhn celebrates paradigmatic pluralism. Kuhn's 
incommensurability concept that scientists are imprisoned in a prison they 
create. The Kuhn’s concept constitutes a concept of theoretical truth which 
has no relevance in the practise field because of the absence of dialogue 
among paradigms. In author’s opinion, the competing paradigms are 
absolutely and extremely discontinuous due to discuss overall the same 
study topics and both offer contradictory answers logically. However, Kuhn 
presumes that the discontinuity of the competing paradigm is far from 
radical, because it discusses some of the same study topics and can offer 
mutually disagreeing answers. 
Kuhn states: "Science is a social product and a product of the 
scientific community".44 According to the author, the universe is not merely 
 
42 Kuhn, 206. 
43 Kuhn, 206. 




a social construction as Kuhn believed. The universe has two domains; the 
first is a transitive domain, the domain in which social processes affect the 
universe, and no object can be separated from the representations we use 
(theory, method, language and so on); the second is a intransitive domain, 
the domain of natural objects independent of human construction. The 




As a result, Kuhn's great project on the revolution of science actually 
works on three levels of meanings. First, it is unique that the revolution of 
science is the field of science on changes in the scientific concepts. Second, 
it works on a wider scientific element, because it brings changes in 
understanding universe. Third, it is philosophical, namely as part of a shift of 
Western society's understanding the values. Meanwhile, income-
mensurability among paradigms or competing paradigms does not always 
occur, because the two paradigms may in fact operate within their respective 
frameworks. Presumably, it is eligible to understand the concept of 
Lyotard’s paralogy that each paradigm has its logic 'games' which should not 





Adian, D G. Menyoal Objektivisme Ilmu Pengetahuan: Dari David Hume 
Sampai Thomas Kuhn. Penerbit Teraju, 2002. 
https://books.google.co.id/books?id=EFwoywAACAAJ. 
Bagir, Zainal Abidin. “Hand out Kuliah Filsafat Kealaman,” 2008. 
Bakker, Anton, Zubair, Charris. Metodologi Penelitian Filsafat. Yogyakarta: 
Kanisius, 1990. 
Broadbent, T. A. A., I. Lakatos, and A. Musgrave. “Criticism and the Growth 
of Knowledge.” The Mathematical Gazette, 1972. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3613721. 
Chalmers, A F. Apa Itu Yang Dinamakan Ilmu?: Suatu Penilaian Tentang 
Watak Dan Status Ilmu Serta Metodenya. Hasta Mitra, 1983. 
https://books.google.co.id/books?id=2JdEAQAACAAJ. 
Disruption and Incommensurability Among Thomas S. Kuhn’s Paradigms 
KALAM, Volume 15, No. 1 (2021) 119 
 
Habermas, Jurgen. Theory of Communication Action (1): Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984. 
Jacobs, Struan, and Brian Mooney. “Sociology as a Source of Anomaly in 
Thomas Kuhn’s System of Science.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 
27, no. 4 (1997): 466–85. 
Kaelan. Metode Penelitian Kualitatif Bidang Filsafat. Yogyakarta: 
Paradigma, 2005. 
Kesuma, Ulfa. “Pemikiran Thomas S. Kuhn Teori Revolusi Paradigma.” 
Islamadina 21, no. 2 (2020). 
Kristanto, H. Dwi. “Ketidakpercayaan Terhadap Metanarasi Kondisi 
Postmodern.” Driyarkara XXV, no. 3 (2002). 
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, 2013. 
https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226458106.001.0001. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. “The Relation Between History and History of Science.” 
In Interpretatif Social Science A Reader, edited by William Rabinow, 
Paul, M. Sullivar. London: University of California Press, 1979. 
Mustansir, Rizal. Filsafat Analitik, Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Peranan Para 
Tokohnya. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2001. 
Nurkholis. “Konstruksi Teori Paradigma Thomas S. Kuhn.” Islam Future 
XI, no. 2 (2012). 
Peursen, Van. Fakta, Nilai, Peristiwa: Tentang Hubungan Ilmu Dan Etika. 
Edited by A. Sonny Keraf. Terjemahan. Jakarta: Gramedia, 1990. 
Poespoprodjo. Interpretasi. Bandung: Remaja Karya, 1987. 
Roderick, Rick. Jurgen Habermas and Fundations of Critical Theory. New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 1986. 
Sudarminta, J. “Diktat Epistemologi, Pengantar Ke Beberapa Masalah 
Pokok Filsafat Pengetahuan.” Jakarta, 2000. 
Sugiharto, I. Postmodernisme, Tantangan Bagi Filsafat. Yogyakarta: 
Kanisius, 1996. 
Susanto, Ferry. “Thomas S. Kuhn: Relativis Epistemologis?” XXV. Jakarta, 
n.d. 
Tresch, John. “On Going Native: Thomas Kuhn and Anthropological 





Trisakti, Sonjoruri B. “Thomas S. Kuhn Dan Tradisi-Inovasi Dalam 
Langkah Metodologi Riset Ilmiah.” Jurnal Filsafat, 2008. 
Verhaak, C., Haryono Imam, R. Filsafat Ilmu Pengetahuan. Jakarta: 
Gramedia Pustaka, 1989. 
 
